Second-best mechanisms for land assembly and hold-out problems

Zachary Grossman, Jonathan Pincus, Perry Shapiro, Duygu Yengin

Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Grossman, Zachary ; Pincus, Jonathan James ; Shapiro, Perry ; Yengin, Duygu
Published in:	Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 175.2019, p. 1-16
Subject:	Assembly problems \| Budget-balance \| Complementary goods \| Desirable properties \| Eminent domain \| Hold-out \| Impossibility theorem \| Incentive compatibility \| Individual rationality \| Just compensation \| Land assembly \| Mechanism design \| Property rights \| Public-private partnerships \| Second-best characterization \| Self-finance \| SP mechanism \| Strategy-proofness \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Sachenrecht \| Law of property \| Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft \| Public-private partnership \| Second Best \| Second best \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Rationalität \| Rationality \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Landnutzung \| Land use \| Enteignung \| Expropriation

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.03.002 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012160545