Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

Yuji Fujinaka; Takuma Wakayama

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable. -- Secure implementation ; Dominant strategy implementation ; Nash implementation ; Indivisible goods ; Strategy-proofness

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Year of publication:	Oct. 2007
Other Persons:	Fujinaka, Yuji (contributor) ; Wakayama, Takuma (contributor)
Publisher:	Tokyo : Inst. of Social and Economic Research, Osaka Univ.
Subject:	Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Theorie \| Theory