Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.

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Year of publication:	2007-10
Authors:	Fujinaka, Yuji ; Wakayama, Takuma
Institutions:	Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023664