Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

This paper studies secure implementation [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Economics 2, 203-229] in economies with indivisible objects and money. We establish that on any minimally rich domain that is proposed in our paper, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Fujinaka, Yuji ; Wakayama, Takuma
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 100.2008, 1, p. 91-95
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005296530