Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Saporiti, Alejandro |
Publisher: |
Manchester : School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester |
Subject: | Secure implementation | partial honesty | strategy-proofness | single-crossing preferences | representative (median) voter | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter |
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