Seemingly opportunistic management earnings guidance before stock option grants : does it misrepresent firms' underlying performance?
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Rees, Lynn ; Srivastava, Anup ; Tse, Senyo |
Published in: |
Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics : APJAE. - Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, ISSN 1608-1625, ZDB-ID 2193203-7. - Vol. 21.2014, 2, p. 107-133
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Subject: | stock options | earnings guidance | information content | incentives | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Informationswert | Information value | Gewinn | Profit | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Gewinnprognose | Earnings announcement | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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