Selection of One Nash Equilibrium in the One-Dimensional Linear-Quadratic Differential Game.

We study a selection method for a Nash feedback equilibrium of a one-dimensional linear-quadratic nonzero sum game over an infinite horizon: by introducing a change in the time variable, one obtains an associated game over a finite horizon T > 0 and with free terminal state. This associated game admits a unique solution which converges to a particular Nash feedback equilibrium of the original problem as the horizon T goes to infinity.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Cartigny, P. ; Michel, P.
Institutions:	Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE)
Subject:	GAMES \| TIME FACTOR \| ECONOMIC MODELS

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Series:	G.R.E.Q.A.M..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	13 pages
Classification:	C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779618