Selection of public servants into politics : an economic analysis of its causes and consequences

Thomas Brändle

Abstract: Die Selektion öffentlicher Bediensteter in die Politik ist ein weitverbreitetes, jedoch kaum verstandenes Phänomen. Einerseits generiert die starke Vertretung öffentlicher Bediensteter in der Politik Interessenkonflikte und weckt Bedenken bezüglich des Gewaltenteilungsprinzips. Andererseits bringen öffentliche Bedienstete relevante Erfahrung in den Gesetzgebungs- und Aufsichtsprozess ein. Diese Studie ist die erste systematische, ökonomische Analyse der institutionellen Bestimmungsgründe und der Konsequenzen der Selektion öffentlicher Bediensteter in die Politik. Der Autor unterstreicht die Bedeutung von politischen Institutionen für das Verhalten und die Selektion von politischen Entscheidungsträgern

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Year of publication:	2013 ; 1. Aufl.
Authors:	Brändle, Thomas
Publisher:	Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlag
Subject:	Öffentlicher Dienst \| Civil service \| Arbeitsplatzwechsel \| Job changing \| Politiker \| Politicians \| Parlament \| Parliament \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Deutschland \| Germany \| Landtag \| Beamter \| Repräsentation <Politik> \| Politische Ökonomie \| Abgeordneter \| Karriere \| Berufswechsel \| Gesetzgebung
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [swbplus.bsz-bw.de]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (166 Seiten)
Series:	Neue Studien zur Politischen Ökonomie ; 12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Hochschulschrift
Language:	English
Thesis:	Zugl.: Basel, Univ., Diss., 2012
Notes:	Description based upon print version of record I Introduction; II Economics of Political Selection; 1 Two complementary views: sanctioning and selection; 1.1 Political sanctioning; 1.2 Political selection; 2 Which institutions impact political selection?; 2.1 Pay for politicians; 2.2 Electoral rules and parties; 3 Direct professional interest representation in politics; 3.1 Businessmen in politics; 3.2 Lawyers in politics; 4 Discussion; III Selection of Public Servants into Politics: A First Pass; 1 Introduction; 2 The rationale and some history behind (in)compatibility regimes; 2.1 A short recapitulation of (in)compatibility regimes 2.2 Selection effects of incompatibility rules3 Empirical analysis for the political selection of public servants; 3.1 Data; 3.2 Results; 4 Consequences for political outcomes; 4.1 The trade-off between conflicts of interest and competence; 4.2 Empirical analysis; 5 Concluding remarks; IV Theory and Evidence on the Determinants in Germany; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical considerations; 2.1 Ineligibility and incompatibility of public service with a parliamentary mandate; 2.2 The cost-benefit calculus of running for political office; 2.3 Public servants as voters; 3 Empirical analysis; 3.1 Data 3.2 Results4 Concluding remarks; V Consequences for Legislative Oversight; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical considerations; 2.1 Relevance of parliamentary oversight; 2.2 Incentives for parliamentary oversight; 2.3 Public servants as legislators; 2.4 Additional determinants of parliamentary oversight; 2.5 Hypotheses on parliamentary oversight; 3 Institutional background; 4 Empirical analysis; 4.1 Data; 4.2 Results; 5 Concluding remarks; VI Consequences for Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical considerations; 2.1 Political partisanship; 2.2 Political patronage 2.3 Political selection of public servants3 Empirical analysis; 3.1 Data; 3.2 Estimation strategy and empirical results; 4 Concluding remarks; VII Conclusions; 1 Summary; 2 Implications for constitutional choice; 3 Implications for economic research; References; Appendix
ISBN:	978-3-8487-0307-4 ; 3-8487-0307-6 ; 978-3-8452-4643-7 ; 978-3-8452-4643-7 ; 978-3-8487-0307-4
Other identifiers:	10.5771/9783845246437 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012015156