Selective contracts, foreclosure, and the Chicago School view
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Stefanadis, Christodoulos |
Published in: |
The journal of law & economics. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0022-2186, ZDB-ID 218304-3. - Vol. 41.1998, 2, p. 429-450
|
Subject: | Microsoft Corporation | Vertriebsbindung | Exclusive dealing | Markteintritt | Market entry | Chicago-Schule | Chicago School | Theorie | Theory | Wettbewerbsaufsicht | Competition authority | Softwareindustrie | Software industry | USA | United States | 1994 |
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