Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Miralles, Antonio |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 42.2010, 3, p. 523-538
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Auctions | Entry costs | Pre-play communication |
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