Self-interest through delegation : an additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship

by John R. Hamman, George Loewenstein, and Roberto A. Weber

Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Hamman, John R. ; Loewenstein, George ; Weber, Roberto A.
Published in:	The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 100.2010, 4, p. 1826-1846
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Eigeninteresse \| Self-interest \| Kooperative Führung \| Participative leadership

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