Self-policing and optimal law enforcement when violator remediation is valuable
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Innes, Robert D. |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. Press, ISSN 0022-3808, ZDB-ID 3026-0. - Vol. 107.1999, 6/1, p. 1305-1325
|
Subject: | remediation | Kriminalitätsökonomik | Economics of crime | Soziale Kosten | Social costs | Kriminalpolitik | Criminal policy | Normbefolgung | Legal compliance | Theorie | Theory |
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