Self-Worth Versus Net Worth : Image Motivation and the Quantity-Quality Trade-Off

In this paper we study the quantity-quality trade-off among professionals and how this trade-off may change in the presence of concerns over self-image. Concern over self-image (self-reputation) can motivate performance at work (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002), but there is little empirical work to date on self-image as a performance incentive. We use a real-effort framed field experiment to investigate how judges in Tajikistan allocate effort to quantity and quality of work. The treatments include a prime for self-image (anonymous visibility), a performance-based bonus incentive and a combination of the two. We find that subjects respond to both anonymous visibility and bonus incentives with increased quantity of work, and respond to a bonus with worse quality. However, judges are less willing to earn points from poor quality work in a bonus treatment if a peer might see it, albeit anonymously. This study provides evidence on the power of self-image, independent of external reputation, to motivate less opportunistic behaviour, even in a legal system with low accountability. More broadly, this study provides evidence of the economic importance of self-image