Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Neugebauer, Tibor ; Perote, Javier ; Schmidt, Ulrich ; Loos, Malte
Publisher:	Kiel : Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Subject:	Öffentliches Gut \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Eigeninteresse \| Experiment \| Theorie \| Information feedback \| Public goods \| Voluntary contributions \| Conditional cooperation \| Experimental economics

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Series:	Kiel Working Paper ; 1376
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	543700062 [GVK] hdl:10419/4066 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1376 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272953