Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts [Bloch, F., 1996. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games Econ. Behav. 14, 90-123]. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core [Kóczy, L.Á., 2007. A recursive core for partition function form games. Theory Dec. 63, 41-51].
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kóczy, László Á. |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 66.2009, 1, p. 559-565
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Core Externalities Sequential coalition formation Order-independent equilibria |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Prospects after the voting reform of the Lisbon Treaty
Kóczy, László Á., (2010)
-
Strategic aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU enlargements
Kóczy, László Á., (2010)
-
Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Kóczy, László Á., (2014)
- More ...