Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	David, Gill ; Daniel, Sgroi
Published in:	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704. - Vol. 4.2004, 1, p. 1-10
Publisher:	De Gruyter

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010640081