Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Gill, David ; Sgroi, Daniel
Published in:	Topics in Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 4.2004, 1, p. 1178-1178
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	takeovers \| sequential \| pivotal

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejte-1178
Classification:	L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178530