Cover Image

Sequential Decisions with Several Agents

We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given
Year of publication:
1999
Authors: Bassan, Bruno ; Scarsini, Marco
Publisher: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject: Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Entscheidung | Decision | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory
Description of contents: Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]
Check Google Scholar |
In German libraries (KVK)
I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216078
Similar items by subject
Similar items by person