Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Gur, Yonatan ; Macnamara, Gregory ; Saban, Daniela |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 68.2022, 4, p. 2714-2731
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Subject: | dynamic contracts | dynamic games | Gittins index | incomplete information | learning | no commitment | perfect Bayesian equilibrium | procurement | quality experimentation | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Lernprozess | Learning process | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Beschaffung | Procurement | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrag | Contract | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
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