Sequential Regulatory Oversight.
We examine a setting where a different regulatory commission controls the activities of a firm in each of two periods. Each commission is concerned primarily with the welfare of contemporary consumers. We examine the efficacy of three different regulatory charters in resolving the intertemporal conflicts that arise between commissions. These charters specify the extent to which the second-period commission is bound to promises made by its predecessor. Copyright 1990 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lewis, Tracy R ; Sappington, David E M |
Published in: |
Journal of Regulatory Economics. - Springer. - Vol. 2.1990, 4, p. 327-48
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Technological Change and the Boundaries of the Firm.
Lewis, Tracy R, (1991)
-
Contracting with Wealth-Constrained Agents.
Lewis, Tracy R, (2000)
-
Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination.
Lewis, Tracy R, (1994)
- More ...