Sequential versus Simultaneous Auctioning of Procurement Contracts with Common Value and Private Value Components

We study procurement auctions held in sequential and simultaneous formats. For thelatter format, we find less bid participation and more aggressive bidding for projects withstrong common value components and more competition for projects having strong privatevalue components.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Dakshina, De Silva ; Beatrice, Pagel ; Ronald, Peeters
Institutions:	Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), School of Business and Economics
Subject:	microeconomics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Research Memorandum.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Research Memoranda Number 005
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160311