Sequential versus Simultaneous Auctioning of Procurement Contracts with Common Value and Private Value Components

We study procurement auctions held in sequential and simultaneous formats. For thelatter format, we find less bid participation and more aggressive bidding for projects withstrong common value components and more competition for projects having strong privatevalue components.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	De Silva, Dakshina ; Pagel, Beatrice ; Peeters, Ronald
Institutions:	Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
Subject:	microeconomics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Research Memoranda.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Research Memoranda Number 005
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209917