Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Izquierdo, Josep M. ; Llerena Garrés, Francesc ; Rafels, Carles |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 50.2005, 3, p. 318-330
|
Subject: | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Core |
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