Setting Incentives for Scientists Who Engage in Research and Other Activities: An Application of Principal-Agent Theory
Year of publication: |
2010-06-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Huffman, Wallace E. ; Just, Richard E. |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Iowa State University |
Subject: | incentives | Principal-agent model | Multitask | scientists | professors | respeat contracting | linear contracts |
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