Sex-oriented stable matchings of the marriage problem with correlated and incomplete information

In the stable marriage problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both numerically and analytically.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Caldarelli, Guido ; Capocci, Andrea ; Laureti, Paolo
Published in:	Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. - Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4371. - Vol. 299.2001, 1, p. 268-272
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Stable marriage \| Bounded rationality \| Game theory

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010872187