Sharp thresholds for monotone non-Boolean functions and social choice theory
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kalai, Gil ; Mossel, Elchanan |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0364-765X, ZDB-ID 195683-8. - Vol. 40.2015, 4, p. 915-925
|
Subject: | combinatorics | voting | probability | cooperative game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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