Shirking versus managerial incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) : a note on a possible misunderstanding of principal-agent theory
by Werner Güth
| Year of publication: |
1995
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| Authors: | Güth, Werner |
| Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 151.1995, 4, p. 693-698
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| Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Motivation | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
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| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001193175