Should sellers prefer auctions? : a laboratory comparison of auctions and sequential mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Davis, Andrew M. ; Katok, Elena ; Kwasnica, Anthony M. |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 60.2014, 4, p. 990-1008
|
Subject: | behavioral operations management | auctions | experimental economics | behavioral mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Experiment | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktion | Auction | Experimentelle Ökonomik | Experimental economics | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics |
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