Should shareholders just vote no? : examining the impact of shareholder proposals
| Year of publication: |
2025
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | King, Timothy ; Williams, Jonathan |
| Published in: |
Corporate Governance in the Banking and Financial Sector : Innovations and Adaptations in a Changing Landscape. - Cham : Springer Nature Switzerland, ISBN 978-3-031-83353-3. - 2025, p. 213-256
|
| Subject: | Agency costs | Corporate governance | Dodd-Frank Act | Proxy access | Shareholder proposals | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Corporate Governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Aktienstimmrecht | Shareholder voting rights | Shareholder Value | Shareholder value | Aktiengesellschaft | Listed company |
-
Why Shareholders Shouldn't Vote : A Marxist-Progressive Critique of Shareholder Empowerment
Talbot, Lorraine E., (2015)
-
Option repricing, corporate governance, and the effect of shareholder empowerment
Gulen, Huseyin, (2017)
-
Monitoring or empowering CEOs? : the moderating effect of shareholder rights
Al-Dah, Bilal, (2018)
- More ...
-
King, Timothy, (2025)
-
Disruptive Technology in Banking and Finance : An International Perspective on FinTech
King, Timothy, (2021)
-
Disruptive technology in banking and finance : an international perspective on FinTech
King, Timothy, (2021)
- More ...