Showing off in subjective performance evaluation

This paper analyzes a mathematical model to examine a situation where an agent can show off his efforts to the principal for a higher evaluation under a one-period employment contract based on subjective performance evaluation. The analysis results indicated that the agent could achieve an efficient contract even under the one-period subjective performance evaluation by showing off. We also showed that the cost of showing off and comparing the range of increase in the probability of high evaluation according to the level of effort are essential variables in deciding to show off

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Morimitsu, Takahiro ; Kimura, Taichi
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Performance-Messung \| Performance measurement \| Personalbeurteilung \| Employee appraisal \| Experiment \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081634