Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Barsanetti, Bruno ; Camargo, Braz |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 206.2022, p. 1-36
|
Subject: | Adverse selection | Market efficiency | Signaling | Trading frictions | Adverse Selektion | Theorie | Theory | Signalling | Effizienzmarkthypothese | Efficient market hypothesis | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism |
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