Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions

Bo Chen, Yu Chen and David Rietzke

Year of publication:	August 2017
Authors:	Chen, Bo ; Chen, Yu ; Rietzke, David
Publisher:	Graz : Department of Economics, Department of Public Economics, University of Graz
Subject:	Forcing Contract \| Forcing Principle \| Moral Hazard \| Observable Actions \| First-best Benchmark \| Moral hazard \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Benchmarking \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive

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