Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Chen, Bo ; Chen, Yu ; Rietzke, David |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 69.2020, 4, p. 1023-1047
|
Subject: | First-best benchmark | Forcing contract | Forcing principle | Moral hazard | Observable actions | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Benchmarking | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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