Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Kartik, Navin ; Tercieux, Olivier ; Holden, Richard
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 83.2014, C, p. 284-290
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Behavioral mechanism design \| Implementation \| Lying costs \| Separable domain

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738055