Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. We analyze some sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically faced with these mechanisms. Two mechanisms implement the core correspondence in SPE, whereas the third implements the students' optimal stable solution.

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Year of publication:	1996-10
Authors:	Pérez, José Alcalde ; Romero-Medina, Antonio
Institutions:	Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE)
Subject:	College admissions problems \| mechanism design

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers. Serie AD.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published by Ivie 28 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542866