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Size-Dependent Minimum-Effort Games and Constrained Interactions

This paper develops a stochastic learning model in which agents choose a limited number of partners to play size-dependent minimum-effort games. The payoff for each agent in this interaction depends on the minimum of the efforts of her partners and herself, and is increasing with the size of her interaction neighborhood. We show that when agents interact with everyone with whom they have a link, whoever forms it, coordination on the lowest effort is (uniquely) selected in the long run
Year of publication:
2022
Authors: Cui, Zhiwei ; Jiang, Ge ; Shi, Fei
Publisher: [S.l.] : SSRN
freely available
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