Social Norms, Moral Commitment, and Cooperation
Normative Game theory does not consider cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) as a serious strategy. Recent research has, therefore, introduced nonmonetary values to explain why individuals may choose to cooperate in PD-Games. It is not explained, however, where the values come from. Under the assumption of endogenous preferences we show that educating individuals towards a moral commitment can change preferences in a way that a deliberate willingness for cooperation is created. For that we provide a utility function where the compliance to social norms generates utility. Accordingly, we regard the decisions of morally committed individuals as rational.
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Kritikos, Alexander ; Meran, Georg |
Published in: |
Homo Oeconomicus. - Institute of SocioEconomics. - Vol. 15.1998, p. 71-92
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Publisher: |
Institute of SocioEconomics |
Saved in:
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