Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Maniquet, François
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 143.2008, 1, p. 199-215
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Indivisible good Social ordering function Leximin

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112182