Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: a note

I refine and extend the Markov perfect equilibrium of the social security policy game in Forni (2005) for the special case of logarithmic utility. Under the restriction that the policy function be continuous, instead of differentiable, the equilibrium is globally well defined and its dynamics always stable. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin
Published in:	Review of Economic Dynamics. - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED. - Vol. 14.2011, 3, p. 549-552
Publisher:	Society for Economic Dynamics - SED
Subject:	Social security \| Overlapping generations models \| Markov equilibria

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Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Published
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.red.2010.07.002 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466108