Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single-peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and "solidarity" (population-monotonicity or replacement-domination) must equal a so-called target rule. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Ehlers, Lars ; Klaus, Bettina
Published in:	Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 3.2001, 2, p. 167-84
Publisher:	Association for Public Economic Theory - APET

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005143306