Some cooperatives produce great wines, but the majority does not : complementary institutional mechanisms to improve the performance of an indispensable organizational form
Year of publication: |
2017
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Authors: | Frick, Bernd |
Published in: |
Journal of wine economics. - New York, NY : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISSN 1931-4361, ZDB-ID 2520377-0. - Vol. 12.2017, 4, p. 386-394
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Subject: | adverse selection | firm performance | moral hazard | organizational design | organizational form | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Organisationsstruktur | Organizational structure | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmensorganisation | Business organization | Theorie | Theory |
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