Some remarks on restricted bargaining sets

We analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different equivalence results. In addi- tion, several counterexamples state boundaries for the possibility of extending and generalizing our results.

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Year of publication:	2012-06-10
Authors:	Hervés-Estévez, Javier ; Moreno-García, Emma
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Bargaining sets \| coalitions \| core \| veto mechanism

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; D41 - Perfect Competition ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D00 - Microeconomics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107345