Some Results on the Constructive Existence of Equilibrium in Finite Games

For finite games in strategic form it is shown that, in a Nash equlibrium, every player uses a strategy which is computable. However, there can exist no algorithm which is guaranteed to find an equilibrium for every instance of a game with computable payoffs. In contrast, an e-equilibrium is always computable (this is what Scarf type algorithms find).

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Prasad, K.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Florida State University
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| NASH EQUILIBRIUM

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005273046