SORTING WITH MOTIVATED AGENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOLCOMPETITION AND TEACHER INCENTIVES

This paper proposes a simple framework to study incentives and matching in the marketfor teachers. The framework is used to investigate the consequences of introducing incentivepay for teachers when contracts have both a matching and an incentive effect. Our analysissuggests that school competition and teacher incentives cannot be studied in isolation from oneanother.[...]

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Year of publication:	2006-05-01
Authors:	Besley, Timothy ; Ghatak, Maitreesh
Institutions:	London School of Economics and Political Science
Published in:	London School of Economics and Political Science - Published Papers
Subject:	Wettbewerb \| market microstructure \| Sortieren \| sorting \| Lehrer \| Prämienlohn \| rank incentives \| Schule

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Extent:	92160 bytes 11 p. application/pdf
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; I20 - Education. General ; J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets ; L31 - Nonprofit Institutions ; Theory of organisation ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Individual Reports, Studies ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008911468