Spatial Cournot competition and timing of endogenous wage setting

This paper studies the problem of location-quantity choice in a duopoly in which the wage paid by each firm is set by the corresponding monopoly union. Compared with the outcome obtained in location-price choice game, we find that the wage setting choice for both unions does not change in our model, they still choose to set wage sequentially. The equilibrium locations are not influenced by the timing of wage setting.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Wang, Qiang ; He, Yuanyuan ; Chen, Qi
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 29.2009, 3, p. 1772-1782
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Keywords:	endogenous product costs spatial competition Cournot model location choice

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562833