Splitting the Baby in Two: How to Solve Solomon's Dilemma when Agents are Boundedly Rational.

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King Solomon's Dilemma, on the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic learning dynamics, and also with best-reply dynamics.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Ponti, G.
Subject:	RATIONALITY \| SOCIAL CHOICE \| GAME THEORY

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	26 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D10 - Household Behavior and Family Economics. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005245510