Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule : when all single-peaked preferences are admissible
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Weymark, John A. |
Publisher: |
Vancouver |
Subject: | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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