Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible

Sprumont (1991) has established that the only allocation rule for the division problem that is strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous is the uniform rule when the domain is the set of all possible profiles of continuous single-peaked preferences. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule is shown to hold on any larger domain of single-peaked preferences.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999-12-15
Authors:	Weymark, John A.
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 4.1999, 4, p. 389-393
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Division problem \| uniform rule \| strategy-proofness \| single-peaked preferences

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 15 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 April 1999
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005147302