Spurious unanimity and the Pareto principle
Philippe Mongin
| Year of publication: |
November 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Mongin, Philippe |
| Published in: |
Economics & philosophy. - Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISSN 0266-2671, ZDB-ID 85701-4. - Vol. 32.2016, 3, p. 511-532
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| Subject: | Pareto principle | unanimity preservation | spurious unanimity | aggregation of ex ante preferences | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Aggregation | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1017/S0266267115000371 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011710169