Stability and strategy‐proofness for matching with constraints : a necessary and sufficient condition

Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts.

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Year of publication:	May 2018
Authors:	Kamada, Yuichiro ; Kojima, Fuhito
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 13.2018, 2, p. 761-793
Subject:	Matching with constraints \| medical residency matching \| school choice \| stability \| strategy-proofness \| matching with contracts \| hierarchy \| Matching \| Theorie \| Theory \| Schulauswahl \| School choice \| Ärzte \| Physicians